Category Archives: Firearms Law

Colt Bankruptcy

I am aware that some purchasers of Colt firearms are concerned with the announcement earlier this month that the company has filed for bankruptcy.  Please note that Colt’s press release on the subject found here explains that Colt requested that the Bankruptcy Court approve its “requests to protect trade creditors, vendors, and suppliers thereby allowing for its operations to continue uninterrupted during the Bankruptcy Court supervised sales process.”  In short, if you have paid for a purchase and are awaiting delivery of a firearm or if you returned a firearm for repair, Colt has said that the corporate restructuring will not interfere with “normal business operations”.

If you have a more substantial financial interest in Colt — as a shareholder or bondholder or lender — you may want to consult with an attorney who handles bankruptcy matters for further explanation of the potential impact upon your interests.

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Pennsylvania Firearms Law Seminar – July 25, 2015!

On July 25, 2015, Chief Counsel Joshua Prince and Attorney Eric Winter of Firearms Industry Consulting Group (FICG), a division of Prince Law Offices, P.C., in conjunction with King Shooters Supply, will offer a four (4) hour seminar on state and federal firearms law at their store located at  346 E Church Rd, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406.

The cost is $10 and you must register early, as last time it sold out fast. You can find out further information on King Shooters Supply’s website or on King Shooters Supply’s FB page.  All registrations are to be mailed or dropped off at King Shooters Supply, 346 E Church Rd, King of Prussia PA 19406. If you have questions, please feel free to contact King Shooters Supply at 610-491-9901 .


Filed under Firearms Law, News & Events, Pennsylvania Firearms Law

PA Supreme Court Decision in Musau Affects Firearms Rights – Ability to Obtain Relief from Certain DUIs!

I previously blogged about the Monumental Firearms Law related Decision from the Superior Court in relation to DUI. In Commonwealth v. Musau, 2013 PA Super 159, the Superior Court held that an individual who, during a first or second DUI, refused to provide blood or breath testing, could only be punished by a maximum of six (6) months in jail, although it is graded as a misdemeanor of the 1st degree. As the maximum sentence that could be imposed was six months, although graded as a misdemeanor of the 1st degree, such a conviction would not trigger the federal disability, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922.

While the Commonwealth filed a Petition for Review with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court regarding the Superior Court’s decision in Musau, which was docketed at 510 EAL 2013, the General Assembly acted and amended the law, which was signed by former Governor Corbett on October 27, 2014. As a result, SB 1239 effectively changed section 3802, so that the maximum sentence that can be imposed upon an individual who, during a first or second DUI, refuses to provide blood or breath testing, is five years, which consistent with most misdemeanors of the first degree.

BUT, the PA Supreme Court took no action on the appeal of the Superior Court’s decision in Musau. That is until June 10, 2015, when the Court DENIED the Commonwealth’s Petition for Review. This means that the Superior Court’s decision in Musau is still controlling.

Therefore, if you or a family member were convicted of a first or second DUI, where you/they refused to submit to chemical testing, you may have the ability to petition the court to have your conviction properly reflect the sentencing, which could not be punished by more than six (6) months and therefore would not trigger a state or federal firearms disability. Under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, time is LIMITED.

Contact Us Today to Discuss YOUR Rights – or 888-313-0416

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Quite arguably, the 2nd Amendment took a significant step back recently. In Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, the United States Supreme Court has “voted” to deny certiorari to plaintiff Jackson, et. al’s appeal from the U.S. 9th Circuit’s decision rejecting her challenge of a San Francisco police code which mandates the lock-box storage of firearms in the home and also that such firearms be disabled by a trigger lock. Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco [writ of certiorari denied] 2015 WL 3537821 (2015).   Effectively, this decision on the part of the U.S. Supreme Court a) takes a shotgun shell sized hole out of progress made by proponents of the 2nd Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller and it progeny, and b) leaves the scope of what may be considered the 2nd Amendment fundamental (or “core”) rights, in serious doubt. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). One concession that we may have from all this is the rather strident dissent from the denial of certiorari authored by Justice Thomas, and joined by Justice Scalia. In that dissent, Thomas well lambasts the 9th Circuit decision as being “in serious tension” with Heller – for prohibiting “immediate self defense” of the home. Jackson, 2015 WL at 2. The appeal to common sense made by Thomas is also refreshing. That the San Francisco police code prevents citizens from practicing immediate self-defense when they are “most vulnerable”, at home and/or possibly “sleeping” or otherwise “indisposed”, Thomas cannot fathom how such law does not impose a substantial burden. Id.

How Did We Get Here?

Post-Heller, it seemed improbable that any Federal Court could credibly come to the conclusion that the 9th Circuit has in this case – that the San Francisco Police code in question either a) does NOT place a substantial burden on core 2nd Amendment rights OR b) that the level of scrutiny against such law should be something less than the very highest degree possible (strict scrutiny). To illustrate this point, it is first worth revisiting certain aspects of the holding in Heller and understanding how the wishy-washiness of the Heller decision has proximately opened the door to egregious decisions like Jackson. The reader will probably know that the supposed land-mark nature of Heller achieved a few things for pro-Second Amendment advocates – a) The U.S. Supreme Court held that immediate defense of the hearth/home by conventional firearms, goes to the core of 2nd Amendment rights where the full force of the 2nd Amendment presumably comes into play AND b) rational basis review (the lowest level of means-end scrutiny) is never appropriate to assess laws which impede such self-defense by arms in the home. Heller, supra.  Later, McDonald v. Chicago, decided that the 2nd Amendment (and, by extension, Heller) does apply to the respective states, through the 14th Amendment, and is not merely limited to checking laws issued by the federal government. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

All Over the Place

Critically though, the Heller Court did not specify the level of scrutiny to be applied to such laws (be it strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny); the decision also did not fully delineate what constitutes a “substantial burden” on 2nd Amendment rights even in the context of laws regulating the possession of conventional firearms in the home. Justice Scalia, the author of the Heller decision, may not have foreseen just how fatal this failure would prove to be. But, for proof of the bad omen, we need not go any further than the fact that Mr. Heller is still in court – politicians took immediate advantage of the decision’s weakness by legislating other laws making it (still) very difficult to effectively possess firearms in the District of Columbia (e.g. 1 gun/month purchase limit; mandatory expiration of firearms licenses after 3 years; etc.)! See Heller v. District of Columbia, 45 F.Supp.3d 35 (D.C. 2014). The net effect of this failure has also practically allowed various courts to cobble together their own self-serving jurisprudence wherein what amounts to a “substantial burden” on 2nd Amendment rights and (therefore) which level of scrutiny aught to be applied against laws that impede those rights, is left entirely up to the respective court.

Problematically, courts invariably reference Heller as the seminal authority on what aught to be the scope of 2nd Amendment rights, but do so to reach shockingly different conclusions of law. How do we, for instance, square recent federal court decisions like Ezell v. Chicago (City of Chicago laws which prohibited the operation of gun ranges within city limits while requiring gun-training as a pre-requisite for licensing found to violate the 2nd Amendment as the 7th Circuit held that those laws, in light of Heller, effectively prevented persons from practicing self-defense of the home) or Gowder v. Chicago (where the Federal District Court of the Northern District of Illinois struck state law which forbade permits to persons formerly convicted of non-violent misdemeanors as unconstitutional and triggering strict scrutiny as it, in light of Heller, prevented protection of the home) WITH the 9th Circuit’s decision in Jackson? See Ezell v. Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011); Gowder v. Chicago, 923 F.Supp.2d 1110 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Besides Jackson, there are any number of a host of other puzzling decisions, in theory referencing Heller, but in practice deviating from Heller, and again underlining a distinct lack of consistency in overall 2nd Amendment litigation – For instance, U.S. v. Chovan (the 9th Circuit rules that federal prohibition of persons convicted of misdemeanor-level domestic violence does not impose any cognizable burden on 2nd Amendment rights, in spite of Heller, and therefore does not trigger any heightened scrutiny – rational basis review being appropriate); Or try Kwong v. Bloomberg (New York City ordinance imposing a $340.00 administrative registration fee for each firearm, upheld by the 2nd Circuit; despite making it practically prohibitive to own a firearm in New York City and though imposing a fee some six times larger than other municipalities of the state, the 2nd Circuit found that such law does not substantially burden the 2nd Amendment and chose to apply only intermediate scrutiny). U.S. v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013).

Where Do We Go From Here?

  If anything, these cases (and Jackson in particular) underline how badly in disrepair the state of 2nd Amendment law is, post-Heller, and how much the U.S. Supreme Court should be involved to set forth a solid and repetitive framework for lower courts to follow. Justices Thomas and Scalia appear to realize this. Indeed, the dissent is also notable for how it moves to set the record straight on  Heller so as to save that decision from the ambiguity it has unwittingly fallen into. Specifically, Thomas chided lower courts about their conventional invocation of Heller as a means for them to independently “balance” the perceived burden imposed by a given law on 2nd Amendment rights and (thus) independently apply some appropriate level of scrutiny, on a sliding-scale. Rather, Thomas states that no part of Heller stands for such a proposition and that the takeaway from Heller should have been the obligation of a court to scrutinize “text, history, and tradition.”  Jackson, supra. Thomas’s dissent also debunked an especially favorite contemporary reference to Heller, where courts have taken that decision to mean that anything less than an outright prohibition on the possession of firearms in the home, does not equate to a substantial burden on 2nd Amendment rights.  Id.  But ultimately, when things are all said and done, a dissent is but a footnote in history. For all Thomas’s and Scalia’s upbraiding of Jackson and lower courts’ evisceration of Heller, nothing will necessarily be accomplished on the strength of those words alone.

Citizens of our fair Commonwealth, who also happen to be gun-rights activists, can rest assured though that laws like the one at issue in Jackson are not likely to ever menace the 2nd Amendment in Pennsylvania. There are at least a couple of reasons for this – Pennsylvania’s Uniform Firearms Act has no such onerous regulation and (furthermore) § 6120(a) of the Act preempts any municipality from regulating in this same field. However, for those concerned with a big picture assessment on the state of the 2nd Amendment today you may well ask yourselves, what the Heller was the 9th Circuit and/or the U.S. Supreme Court, thinking?


Filed under Constitutional Law, Firearms Law, Gun Trusts, Pennsylvania Firearms Law

Chester County Sheriff Carolyn Bunny Welsh Does Not Require References on LTCF Applications!

Consistent with a growing number of county sheriffs, Chester County Sheriff Carolyn Bunny Welsh is not requiring license to carry firearms (LTCF) applicants to included references on the LTCF application. I reached out to Sheriff Welsh at the beginning of May about her position on the references, as a friend of mine was applying for a LTCF and did not know if he had to include them.

Chester County Sheriff Carolyn “Bunny” Welsh

Chester County Sheriff Carolyn “Bunny” Welsh

Sheriff Welsh responded that she does not require the references and she believes the deputies at the front counter tell people that references are not required. Sheriff Welsh has a longstanding reputation for being rights oriented, so her response was no surprise. In 2013, the Chester County Sheriff’s Office raffled off an AR-15 to raising $20,000 for their K-9 unit.

As Chief Counsel Joshua Prince has long contended requiring references on the application is a violation of the confidentiality provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. 6111(g)(3.1) and (i), as merely calling the reference, even without disclosing that the applicant has applied for an LTCF, is a violation of the statutory protections, as the caller would be disclosing the “name” and “identity” of the individual, as a result of the application. This issue was addressed in our Class Action against the City of Philadelphia, which resulted in the City of Philadelphia agreeing not to require references. Last November, Berks County Sheriff Eric Weaknecht also announced that he was no longer requiring LTCF applicants to submit references. More recently in January, it came to light that Perry County Sheriff Carl Nace does not require references on LTCF applications.

I would like to thank Sheriff Welsh, Sheriff Nace and Sheriff Weaknecht for following the letter of the law and not requiring references on their LTCF applications.


Filed under Firearms Law, Pennsylvania Firearms Law

Lancaster Ordered to Disclose Donor Information Relating to Legal Defense Fund!

Today, the Office of Open Records (OOR) issued a final determination in relation to my Right to Know Law appeal in relation to, inter alia, the City of Lancaster’s redaction of donor information. You can download a copy of the determination here.  OOR found

Because Section 708(c) prevents the application of 65 P.S. 67.708(b)(13) to financial records as a matter of law, the City has not established that the records of donations to its Legal Defense Fund are exempt from public access.


Although the donations were solicited for a specific, arguably-political purpose (the defense of a lawsuit filed by the NRA), because the City is a non-partisan, political subdivision and the donor list documents the City’s receipt of funds into the City’s bank account, the City has not established that revealing the names and other information concerning the donors would infringe upon the freedom of association provided by the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions.


The City, however, did not subsequently submit any materials in support of withholding records responsive to Items 3 and 4 from public access. Accordingly, based on the lack of evidence provided by the City, the City has not overcome its burden of proof. See 65 P.S. § 67.708(a)(1).

and most importantly,

For the foregoing reasons, Requester’s appeal is granted and the City is required to provide the Requester with all responsive records within thirty days. This Final Determination is binding on all parties.

It will be interesting to see whether the City complies.


Filed under Firearms Law, Pennsylvania Firearms Law

Hunting Violation? Think Twice Before Pleading Guilty…

Hunting license revocation season is upon us. I’ve been contacted by a number of individuals in the last several weeks regarding letters they’ve received from the Pennsylvania Game Commission stating that their hunting licenses have been revoked for the two years or more.


As I’ve stated in the past and continue to maintain, when you are cited for a hunting violation, DO NOT plead guilty immediately. Seek out the advice of legal counsel. Many individuals are under the impression that by simply pleading guilty they will only be responsible for the fine that is attached. Often times, the officer issuing the citation even leads the person to believe that.

Unfortunately, more often than not, an individual will plead guilty, pay the fine and then receive a revocation letter in the mail. These letters are usually sent several months later and by then it is too late to attempt to reopen the guilty plea. As a result, the only option is to request a hearing in front of the Game Commission.

These hearings are conducted in front of a Game Commission Hearing Officer. The Game Commission’s case is presented by the Game Commission Officer. The individual is allowed to cross examine the officer and then present evidence and testimony of their own. The problem for the individual is they’ve already plead guilty to the citation, so there is no disputing they are guilty. The hearing only allows for the individual to present a case as to mitigating or extenuating circumstances for which the Game Commission may take into consideration in reviewing its decision to revoke.

The hearing officer makes a recommendation to the Game Commission itself and the Game Commission issues a final determination. The Game Commission is under no obligation to accept the hearing officer’s recommendation.


What does this mean for you? Several things. First, remember your constitutional right to remain silent. As I previously blogged, the Wildlife Conservation Officers are now able to utilize recording devices in the field. Second, do not make statements without legal counsel present. That includes appearing at a Game Commission office to answer questions in circumstances where you did nothing wrong! Third, if you receive a citation, contact a lawyer immediately. There is an opportunity to fight the citation at the Magisterial District Court level and deal with the issue quickly. Fourth, if you have received a letter stating your license was revoked, contact a lawyer to represent you at the hearing you are entitled to at the Game Commission.

Have you been cited for a hunting violation or know someone who has? Be sure to share this article with your friends and family who hunt. The more informed the hunter is, the less likely they are to have their rights violated. You can share by using the buttons below!

Had a negative experience with the Game Commission? Be sure to leave a comment below!

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