Category Archives: Criminal Law

After an Arrest in Pennsylvania, You Get a Free Phone Call, Right? Well, Not Exactly…

Having watched a lot of Law & Order, most individuals believe that upon arrest, they will be provided at least one free phone call but that isn’t exactly true in Pennsylvania.

Upon arrest, there is no immediate right to a phone call in Pennsylvania. Within a reasonable time of being arrested, the Police officer must either release the defendant or bring the defendant before a Magisterial District Judge to be preliminarily arraigned on charges.

What is a reasonable time? Unfortunately, this is has never been strictly defined in PA and has varied on a case by case basis. One day is generally accepted to be the longest acceptable time to be held without being arraigned.

Moreover, the police do have the authority to arrest people and then release them to be charged later by citation or summons. This type of arrest and release is only allowed in public drunkenness and DUI cases, or in cases in which the individual cannot immediately verify their identity.

There is no right to call anyone during that period of time.

If the police do choose to question a defendant, the individual’s Miranda Rights are implicated. The police must advise a defendant of those rights, including the right to counsel. If a defendant invokes his right to counsel (which you should ALWAYS do IMMEDIATELY, regardless of what the police threaten you with or promised to you), questioning must cease, although there are plenty of examples where the police or a different police officer continues asking questions. In our experience, in most instances, the police will simply end questioning upon invocation of counsel and will not give a defendant an opportunity to obtain counsel.

After the police prepare the charges, a defendant will be brought before a Magisterial District Judge for preliminary arraignment. A defendant does not have a right to contact anyone, including counsel, before or at arraignment. Some judges have also made it difficult for lawyers who know that their client has been arrested to appear at preliminary arraignment (we believe that this a violation of the 6th amendment but have never had a chance to litigate it).

However, after preliminary arraignment, a defendant does have a right to contact individuals, including his/her attorney. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 540 states:

 (H)  After the preliminary arraignment, if the defendant is detained, the defendant shall be given an immediate and reasonable opportunity to post bail, secure counsel, and notify others of the arrest. Thereafter, if the defendant does not post bail, he or she shall be committed to jail as provided by law.

There is no case law interpreting this provision.

At this point, depending on the county, the defendant may be held in custody by the police, the sheriff or a constable. In our experience, the magisterial district judge will normally allow for multiple phone calls.

But, what if my attorney’s phone number is in my wallet or on my phone? Generally, a Judge will allow a defendant to review his/her cell phone or wallet for any phone numbers. We have also seen cases in which the Judge will allow a defendant to use a phone book or will direct court staff to do an internet search to get a phone number. We’ve also seen judges put a defendant in a room with a phone and tell them that they have 15 minutes to call whoever they want.

The only time that we have seen a defendant not be allowed to check their cell phone is if the phone may constitute or contain evidence of a crime. For example, drug dealers often exchange text messages about drug deals. A court would not give a defendant the chance to delete text messages.

So, while there is no obligation to allow a defendant to have access to a wallet or cell phone, the arraigning court does regularly allow it. Even if a defendant is not given that access, they can certainly use a phone book to look up their attorney’s number, or they can call a family member or have a family member call their attorney.

If you or someone you know has been charged with a crime, contact Prince Law Offices, P.C. today to discuss YOUR rights and legal options.


Leave a comment

Filed under Criminal Law, Firearms Law, Pennsylvania Firearms Law

Surreptitious Recording of GOP Meeting Violates Pennsylvania Wiretap Law – But It’s Just a Felony, Right???

To the surprise of many, The Washington Post reported that it obtained a recording of a closed-door meeting of GOP members that occurred on Thursday in the City of Philadelphia. The article even quotes statements made during the closed-door meeting, seemingly ignorant of Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act.

In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to intercept, endeavor to intercept, procure, disclose, endeavor to disclose, use, or endeavor to use an oral communication without that person’s consent. Specifically, 18 Pa.C.S. 5703 provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he:

(1)  intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic or oral communication;

(2)  intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication; or

(3)  intentionally uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication.

While there exists exceptions for law enforcement and other non-applicable bases, the individual who recorded the meeting, anyone who solicited the person to record the meeting, and those individuals and entities which have disclosed and used the recording have clearly committed a felony of the 3rd degree, which permits the individual to be imprisoned for up to 7 years. Moreover, if the individual is a state official or employee, he/she is to be dismissed or removed from office.

Furthermore, there exists civil penalties, which include “actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $ 100 a day for each day of violation, or $ 1,000, whichever is higher;” “punitive damages” and “reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.”

Accordingly, I am calling on Philadelphia District Attorney Seth Williams and PA Attorney General Josh Shapiro to open an investigation into these violation of our laws.


Filed under Criminal Law

Join Us, 04/08/2016, for Live Immigration Law Video Seminar!!

On behalf of Prince Law Offices, P.C., I am pleased to announce that the firm’s attorneys will be utilizing new technology to host informative live video sessions devoted to the various areas of practice we cover: Firearms Law, Workers’ Compensation, Immigration, Civil Rights, Social Security, Corporate Law, Energy Law, Criminal Law, Wills Estates, Family Law, and Civil Litigation.

Please join us for the pilot launch of these sessions, next Friday, April 8th at 6PM, where I will be leading a 1/2 an hour discussion on Immigration Law issues related to Family Immigration benefits, including application requirements, filing fees, time-frames, and new developments in the law.

The program we shall use is called  JITSI,  a new open-source platform which will permit our participants’ full interaction with the seminar including video and voice access by which to share comments and questions.  There is no cost to attend.  Further, there are no limits on the number of possible participants so please, by all means, tell your friends, colleagues, family members, etc., about this exciting new program.

Please note in advance that the purpose of these seminars is to provide general information concerning the previously mentioned areas of law, and not to respond to or offer advice concerning individual legal issues.

At 5:45PM on April 8th, I will post the link for interested parties to join me in the Immigration Law seminar.

Stay tuned for the link and I hope to see you on the 8th.

1 Comment

Filed under ATF, Business Law, Communications Law, Computer Law, Constitutional Law, Consumer Advocacy, Criminal Law, Energy Law, Equine Law, Family Law, Firearms Law, Immigration Law, Landlord/Tenant, Marijuana Law, News & Events, Real Estate, Social Security, Trademark and Copyright, Uncategorized, Wills and Estates, Workers' Compensation

National Consumer Protection Week

Prince Law Offices, P.C. and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) — working with more ftc_logo_430than 100 federal, state and local agencies, consumer groups, and national organizations — will spotlight efforts to protect consumers from fraud, identity theft and other consumer issues during National Consumer Protection Week (NCPW), March 6-12, 2016.

For 18 years, NCPW has been a time to encourage consumers to learn about their rights, and how to make informed buying decisions and report scams, identity theft and unfair business practices. offers information on a wide range of topics, including credit and debt, online safety, imposter and other scams, identity theft and more.

The site features a blog to update visitors on the latest consumer protection news, including legal actions, new resources and partner-sponsored NCPW events. People also can get free resources and promotional tools for their own consumer education activities, as well as information on filing consumer complaints.

“The FTC and our NCPW partners are on the front lines of consumer protection every day,” said Jessica Rich, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “We hope people will take advantage of this week to find resources that will help them fight scams and fraud in their communities all year long.”

During NCPW, partners and hundreds of community groups across the country host events to promote general consumer education or highlight a specific issue, such as a shred-a-thon to reduce the risk of identity theft.

Contact Prince Law Offices, P.C. to lean more about your rights and how to address scams, identity theft and unfair business practices.

Leave a comment

Filed under Business Law, Computer Law, Consumer Advocacy, Criminal Law, News & Events

Changes to CDL Applicants and Renewals

Effective December 21, all new Commercial Drivers License (CDL) applicants and current holders required to renew or make any changes or upgrades to their CDL will need to appear at a PennDOT Driver License Center in person.

The new Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration final rules require license holders to prove citizenship or legal presence in the form of a birth certificate, passport, naturalization documents or current immigration documents in-person.

The requirement to prove citizenship or legal presence for permanent residents and citizens will only need to be done once as a notation will be made on the customer’s record confirming the verification was made and the date it was made.

Leave a comment

Filed under Criminal Law

New Jersey Supreme Court: Warrant Requirement a Burden on Citizens

There has been a lot of commentary on the recent New Jersey Supreme Court case, State v. William L. Witt, (A-9-14)(074468), which essentially did away with a warrant requirement for the search of a vehicle in many circumstances.  What the Court ultimately ruled was that, like Pennsylvania a little over a year ago, New Jersey was going to follow the federal warrant requirements, which are quite a bit more relaxed than New Jersey’s.  In determining to exempt automobiles from the exigency requirements, the Court rested heavily on the presumption that the warrant requirement is unduly burdensome on both police and the suspect, as cars are typically impounded while the long wait for a warrant occurs.  See Slip op. at 15.

The case started when William Witt was pulled over by Carney’s Point Township Police Officer Joseph Racite for failing to dim his high beams.  When Officer Racite approached the car and began speaking with Witt, he noticed the smell of alcohol and put Witt through a series of field sobriety tests.  Witt failed them all.  Subsequently, Witt was arrested for DWI and placed into the back of Officer Racite’s police car.  Up to this point, Officer Racite had acted by the book.  (As a side note, the initial stop was likely inappropriate.  The statute – N.J.S.A. 39:3-60 – requires drivers to dim their high beams “whenever the driver of a vehicle approaches an oncoming vehicle within five hundred feet.”  But Officer Racite was stopped; thus, he was not an oncoming vehicle.  The Court declined to entertain this argument, though, because Witt had not brought this defense at trial.  At trial, he had not even contested the validity of the stop.)

After Witt was cuffed and placed in the police car, Officer Racite then began searching for intoxicating substances.  Under the federal automobile exception, this is allowed.  Once an officer has probable cause that a crime has occurred, he has constitutional authority (under the current case law, at least) to search the car for evidence of the crime that he had probable cause to believe occurred.  From there, the plain sight doctrine applies, meaning that if in the search for one object, the officer discovers another, that evidence may be used as the basis for an entirely different crime.  This is what happened here.  Officer Racite found the firearm in the car and then charged Witt with firearms offenses.

Under New Jersey state law at the time, however, Officer Racite was required to have exigent circumstances.  In short, he needed to be able to articulate reasons why either his life was in danger or the evidence would be destroyed in the time it would take to get a warrant.  Because he could not articulate a reason for either (Witt was handcuffed in the back of the police car), both the trial and appellate courts found that the evidence must be suppressed.

For the reasons below, the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned its prior decisions requiring exigent circumstances for warrantless automobile searches and adopted the federal automobile exception.  Fortunately for Mr. Witt, the decision was prospective.  Because the law at the time of his arrest required exigent circumstances, the evidence in his case remained suppressed and he was not convicted of the firearms offense.  Going forward, however, police do not need a warrant to search your automobile, provided they have probable cause to arrest you.

While federal courts have allowed officers to search vehicles and seize evidence from an automobile without a warrant, New Jersey (and until last year, Pennsylvania) required more.  New Jersey had, until last week, required the existence of exigent circumstances.  In other words, there had to be a reason, such as officer safety or the imminent destruction of evidence, to search an automobile without a warrant or consent.

The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on several factors in dispensing with the exigency requirement.  First, the Court found that “the multi-factor exigency formula is too complex and difficult for a reasonable police officer to apply to fast-moving and evolving events that require prompt action.”  Slip op. at 3.  While there is a good argument that a stop in which the suspect is handcuffed and sitting under arrest in the police car can conceivably constitute “fast-paced” or “requir[ing] prompt action,” the Court did rely solely on the “fast-paced” argument.  The Court primarily relied on the same reasoning that Pennsylvania’s adopted in 2014: “The Pennsylvania high court ultimately concluded that it was ‘difficult, if not impossible, for police officers in the field to determine how [it] would rule in motor vehicle search and seizure cases, the circumstances of which are almost endlessly variable.’’  Slip op. at 20-21.

Thus, as the ACLU pointed out in its amicus brief, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that rather than making the point simple: “Get a warrant before you search, unless 1) you’re in danger or 2) the evidence is at risk,” the Court erred on the side of making police work easier.  While there’s nothing inherently wrong with making police officers’ jobs easier, in this case the Court placed simplicity over the Constitution.

The Court’s greatest concern, however, was that getting a warrant – even a telephonic warrant – prolongs the detention and is dangerous to both police and the suspect.  This is because the Court found that the longer any individual remains on the shoulder of the road, the higher the likelihood of an accident.  This is probably true, and the Court does cite a fair number of anecdotes to support its contention, but as the dissent points out admirably, this misses the point.  The prolonged wait was not an inherent part of telephonic warrants, but was rather an inefficiency caused by the state, itself.

The Court rested its decision on the fact that telephonic warrants take a long time to get.  A six-month pilot program conducted three years ago in Burlington County found that the goal of the police should be to obtain a telephonic warrant within a half hour, with 45 minutes being the longest amount of time one should have to wait.  The Burlington program showed that warrants were approximately 59 minutes in the making, while the New Jersey State Police [NJSP] found that they had to wait nearly two hours for a warrant.

Because of the long time in obtaining warrants, it appeared that more New Jersey officers were seeking consent searches, which the Court noted could be a big problem.  After all, NJSP had been through a major racial profiling scandal in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, and the Court was correctly suspicious of whether consent searches were truly consensual.  So-called consent searches placed the driver in an “inherently coercive predicament . . . [because the driver] is stopped on the highway” and facing the choice of full cooperation with a potentially unconstitutional request to search, or increased police scrutiny and possible citation.  “[I]t is not a stretch of the imagination to assume that the individual feels compelled to consent.”  Slip op. at 45.

The Court seemed to be acknowledging that a delay of an hour prompted police to use a more intrusive and constitutionally suspect maneuver.  Indeed, NJSP acknowledged that the “current patrol policy and practice is to exhaust the consent search option prior to making a determination to seek a warrant, telephonic or in-person.”  Slip op. at 35.  It would seem as though the Court’s concern about the inherent voluntariness of a “consent” search was justified.  After all, “exhaust[ing] the consent search option” certainly suggests that NJSP troopers are repeatedly asking for consent, which itself suggests that a fair amount of pressure is being placed on motorists to allow searches.  The 95% consent rate further supports this.

The Court’s solution, however, was not to scrutinize the consent where given, but to eliminate the need for consent or exigency altogether.  Rather, it moved to the next part of the analysis, and attempted to couch the abdication to the State in terms of constitutional protection.

The Court reasoned that a two-hour wait, followed by impoundment of the car (to facilitate a search), was infinitely more intrusive than an on-site search.  While this is true, it entirely misses the point.

First, as any elementary school student should be able to recite, the federal, democratic republican system of government we ostensibly enjoy (and which, notably, is guaranteed to the states in the body of the Constitution), provides that the three branches of government are divided and serve to check one another’s power.  Thus, the legislature passes and funds laws; the executive executes them; and the judiciary keeps watch to ensure everything is being done fairly (John Marshall’s judicial review notwithstanding).  The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, just condensed that, at least regarding automobile searches.  Its decision here gives police officers (part of the executive branch) the judicial authority to determine whether probable cause exists.  Thus, the officer does not actually have to have probable cause.  Rather, he just needs to reasonably believe he does.  That the federal government or other states allow this is no argument (indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s own reasoning in Obergefell – the gay marriage case – belies this, as many states and the federal government had failed to recognize same-sex marriages as of only a few years ago.  The U.S. Supreme Court was unconcerned with the number of states that chose not recognize these marriages).

Second, the Court assumes that impounding a car while waiting to procure a warrant survives constitutional muster, in and of itself.  If there is no warrant, and no exigency, then impounding the car is unconstitutional in the first place.  If it is unconstitutional to search the car, then it is surely unconstitutional to seize the whole thing while waiting for permission to search it.

Should no warrant be forthcoming, then what cause was there to seize the car in the first place?  The Court seemingly authorizes the unreasonable seizure of the car while police wait for the judiciary to determine whether a mere search is constitutional.

), is the fact that the entire constitutional analysis occurred within the framework of a one-county pilot program three years ago.  The purpose of any pilot program is to test ideas and then determine how to fix the mistakes.  New Jersey has a telephonic warrant program that seems to work well for obtaining Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO).  And the dissent notes that there was only a 14 minute gap between the target time and the actual time in local police obtaining warrants.  Could not, then, the state give it one more try?

Rather, the state spent the last several years appealing the exigency requirement whenever it had the chance.  You might say they “exhausted” the appellate option prior to Witt.

In short, the Court found that because there were likely abuses occurring by the police and because New Jersey was having a difficult time efficiently following the constitutional dictates of the Fourth Amendment and its own laws, it was better to merely adopt the federal exemption.  While acknowledging that the federal courts are perfectly fine with the automobile exception, and acknowledging the dangers that police officers face, exempting the government from the constraints of the constitution is not the answer.  Would that New Jersey (and Pennsylvania, for that matter) had considered other options before throwing in the towel.


Filed under Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Firearms Law, News & Events

Berks County DA Dismisses Charges in Relation to Putative Domestic Violence

This week, attorney Jorge Pereira, in conjunction with Chief Counsel Joshua Prince, was successful in having the Berks County District Attorney dismiss felony charges against a client in relation to him putatively providing false information on an application to purchase a firearm as a result of a prior conviction, which the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) erroneously contended was related to domestic violence.

In this matter, the client previously pleaded guilty to a crime involving physical contact; however, as documented in all of the court filings in that matter, the physical contact was in relation to a woman who was a former girlfriend at the time the incident occurred.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 921(a)(33)(A), for a crime to constitute domestic violence, it must be “committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.”

As the client was never married to, shared a child with or cohabited with the victim, and the victim was not a girlfriend of the client at the time, the conviction was not the result of domestic violence. Although the PSP erroneously denied him, the Berks County DA agreed that he was not prohibited under state or federal law, as it was not a crime of domestic violence, and moved to have the charges dismissed.

In these situations, it is imperative to have counsel that understands the subtle differences in the statutory and regulatory law to ensure that your rights are protected. If you, your family members or friends are ever charged with any crimes or have firearms law issues, we are here to help defend YOUR rights. Contact us today!

Leave a comment

Filed under Criminal Law, Firearms Law, Pennsylvania Firearms Law