Some lesser know violations of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.

In keeping with some of my previous blogs concerning lesser-known violations of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, here are several more violations most people are not aware of.

Pennsylvania’s “Unattended Motor Vehicle” law limits where a vehicle can be left running and unattended.

Under § 3701, no person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit the vehicle to stand unattended without placing the gear shift lever in a position which under the circumstances impedes the movement of the vehicle, stopping the engine, locking the ignition in vehicles so equipped, removing the key from the ignition and, when standing upon any grade, turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway and effectively setting the brake. Any person violating this section is guilty of a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of $5.

During the winter months many people start their car to warm it up or leave their car running to keep it warm. The problem is it is against the law to leave the car running unattended. The penalty is nominal and won’t likely stop many people from warming their cars unattended.

Pennsylvania’s “Blind Pedestrians” law mandates that the driver of a vehicle yield the right of way to any totally or partially blind pedestrian carrying a visible white cane or accompanied by a guide dog.

§ 3549 states the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to any totally or partially blind pedestrian carrying a clearly visible white cane or accompanied by a guide dog and shall take such precautions as may be necessary to avoid injuring or endangering the pedestrian and, if necessary, shall stop the vehicle in order to prevent injury or danger to the pedestrian. A violation of the statute is a summary offense and is punishable by a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $150.

Common sense and courtesy is required. Slow your car down or bring it to a stop if you see pedestrian with a cane or with a guide dog.

The “Prohibiting Use of Hearing Impairment Devices” law prohibits any driver from wearing headphones while behind the wheel.

§ 3314 states generally, no driver shall operate a vehicle while wearing or using one or more headphones or earphones. The section does not prohibit the use of hearing aids or other devices for improving the hearing of the driver, nor does it prohibit the use of a headset in conjunction with a cellular telephone that only provides sound through one ear and allows surrounding sounds to be heard with the other ear, nor does it prohibit the use of communication equipment by the driver of an emergency vehicle or by motorcycle operators complying with section 3525 (relating to protective equipment for motorcycle riders).

Wearing headphones while driving limits the driver’s ability to hear sirens belonging to emergency responders, warning horns from other drivers, or pedestrians trying to communicate to the driver.

Distracted drivers pose a deadly risk to everyone on the road. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimates that in 2011, the most recent year for which data is available, 3,331 people lost their lives and another 387,000 were injured in distraction-affected crashes. Pennsylvania has on the books several statutes prohibiting certain behavior that would distract a driver.

§ 3316 (Prohibiting text-based communications) prohibits drivers from operating a motor vehicle on a highway or traffic way in this Commonwealth while using an interactive wireless communications device to send, read or write a text-based communication while the vehicle is in motion. A person does not send, read or write a text-based communication when the person reads, selects or enters a telephone number or name in an interactive wireless communications device for the purpose of activating or deactivating a voice communication or a telephone call. A person who violates subsection (a) commits a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of $50.

§ 1622. (Handheld mobile telephone) only applies to commercial drivers and prohibits a driver from using a handheld mobile telephone while driving a commercial motor vehicle or motor carrier vehicle. An employer may not permit or require a driver of the employer to use a handheld mobile telephone while driving a commercial motor vehicle or a motor carrier vehicle. The statute provides an emergency use exception, which allows a handheld mobile telephone to be used by a driver of a commercial motor vehicle or motor carrier vehicle if necessary to communicate with a law enforcement official or other emergency service.

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$500k Settlement APPROVED Against Philadelphia Regarding Disclosure of Confidential License to Carry Firearms Information Through Postcards

I am proud to announce that today, Judge Linda Carpenter signed a Final Order approving the settlement that was reached with the City of Philadelphia in the matter of A.R., et al.,  v. City of Philadelphia, et al, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas docket no. 151201740, stemming from the City’s disclosure of confidential license to carry firearms (“LTCF”) applicant information through the use of un-enveloped postcards. You can find out more information about the class action lawsuit on the class administrator’s website – http://www.philaltcfclassaction.com/default.aspx.

As a result of the Settlement, the City will pay $500,000 to the 988 class members, who were sent un-enveloped postcards and will be separately responsible for the costs of administering the settlement. Further, and of similar importance, the City has agreed to several policy changes, which can be found starting on page 11 of the Settlement Agreement, including:

  1. Not to send, in any form, un-enveloped postcards containing LTCF applicant or license holder information;
  2. Not to utilized unprotected sign-in sheets, which contain LTCF applicant or license holder information (but does permit them to request initials); and,
  3. Not to verbalize the name or current address of LTCF applicants in a location where non-authorized personnel can hear such information;

A copy of the Final Order is available here. All class members entitled to payment, barring any appeal, should start to receive their checks in very late November/early December.

If your confidential license to carry firearms information has been disclosed, contact Firearms Industry Consulting Group today to discuss YOUR rights and legal options.

 


Firearms Industry Consulting Group® (FICG®) is a registered trademark and division of Civil Rights Defense Firm, P.C., with rights and permissions granted to Prince Law Offices, P.C. to use in this article.

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The Truth About HB 2060 That YOUR Representatives Don’t Want You To Know

Yesterday, the Pennsylvania Senate passed HB 2060 (Prime Sponsor Marguerite Quinn, Republican Bucks), after declining to amend it to address the plethora of constitutional and statutory issues with it, while certain Senate and House Members misled other Members of the General Assembly and the public regarding it. Although all Members of the General Assembly were made aware of these issues through my prior testimony before the House Judiciary Committee and Firearm Owners Against Crime’s review, which I co-authored, numerous Members of the House of Representatives and almost all of the Senate elected to ignore these issues and enact an unconstitutional and statutorily conflicting bill. With the elections of all House Members and a number of Senators coming up in the next couple months, let’s review HB 2060.

The text of HB 2060, as passed by the House and Senate, can be found here. The first issue that arises is in relation to new section 6105(a)(2)(iv) which requires an individual to relinquish his/her firearms, if he she is subjected to a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order. Unlike other provisions in HB 2060, this provision does NOT specify that it is only in relation to a “final protection from abuse act order.” Thus, this provision applies to emergency and temporary PFAs, which are done ex parte, in the absence of all forms of due process. And let us not forget the Cambria County man, who, as a result of a vindictive PFA, was required to turn over his 306 firearms, only for the Court to find that the temporary PFA was baseless; yet, he received a bill for over $1200 for the Sheriff Departments procurement of his firearms, even though he was not provided an opportunity to be heard, before being stripped of his constitutional rights. he then had to retain counsel to fight the bill and for his firearms to be returned to his home, where they were seized from. Of course, those Members that voted in favor of HB 2060 don’t care if constitutional rights are stripped of an individual, in the absence of due process, and where, after due process is provided and the individual is vindicated, that we place costs upon them for having done nothing unlawful or wrongful. It is due to the fact that an individual must be provided due process, before being stripped of a constitutional right, that the U.S. Congress specified in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) that the prohibition is only triggered if the protection order “was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate.” See, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)

The following addition, 6105(a.1)(2), make abundantly clear that it is in relation to temporary PFAs, as it specifies that it will be a misdemeanor of the second degree if any individual subjected to a PFA pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(b) – which specifically addresses temporary order – fails to surrender his/her firearms. This is reiterated in revised section 6105(c)(6), which again cites to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(b). And then, there is the explicit provision added to Title 23, section 6108, that declares:

The court’s order shall require the defendant to relinquish such firearms, other weapons, ammunition and any firearm license pursuant to the provisions of this chapter within 24 hours of service of a temporary order or the entry of a final order or the close of the next business day as necessary by closure of the sheriffs’ offices, except for cause shown at the hearing, in which case the court shall specify the time for relinquishment of any or all of the defendant’s firearms.

But, your Members of the General Assembly told you that an individual cannot be stripped of his/her constitutional right in the absence of due process, right? Well, if so, they lied to you.

Moreover, anyone convicted of failing to turnover his/her firearms will be prohibited for a five year period, pursuant to new section 6105(c)(10).

New section 6105.2 now requires the individual to relinquish his/her firearms within 24 hours following a domestic violence conviction. Interestingly, it does not require a final conviction; thus, one would seemingly be stripped of his/her constitutional right, prior to a final determination (i.e. all appeals being exhausted). New section 6105.2(c) addresses relinquishment to a federal firearms licensee (“FFL”), but unlike later provisions, does not provide the right to relinquish to a “commercial armory” or attorney.  HB 2060 also provides that if the individual initially relinquishes to a law enforcement agency, he/she may request, but only once and provided it is done within six months of relinquishment, that the firearms be transferred to an FFL.

And just to make sure that the constitutional rights of the citizens of the Commonwealth would be violated, new section 6128 is enacted, which addresses “Abandonment of firearms, weapons or ammunition.” This section, in violation of numerous constitutional provisions, including due process and the takings clauses, actually provides that if the individual (or his/her attorney) does not make a written request for return of his/her firearms within one year, the firearms, weapons and ammunition shall be deemed abandoned. Better yet, it allows the law enforcement or other agency in possession of the firearms, weapons or ammunition to reap the rewards of declaring the items abandoned by permitting them to sell the items and to pocket the proceeds. While there is a “limitation” section where limited notice is required, due to the way in which it is drafted, it would only seemingly only apply, where a law enforcement or other agency came into the possession of a firearm through means other than the lawful relinquishment of the firearms, as provided for in new section 6128(a)(2). In essence, this only provides notice to a 3rd party, who turns in a firearm, weapon or ammunition that belongs to someone subjected to a PFA. Hence, the person who has the property interest in the firearm, weapon or ammunition is not provided notice. More importantly, as previously held by the U.S. Supreme Court in Henderson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1780 (2015), even where an individual is prohibited from purchasing and possessing firearms, he/she still retains an property interest in firearms previously acquired and the Government does not procure a property interest in the property merely because the individual has become a prohibited person.

In turning to the amendments to Title 23, we now see a new entity specified (which is not specified in Crimes Code, i.e. Title 18, provisions) which is a “commercial armory.” A commercial armory is defined as “[a] for profit entity which holds the appropriate federal and state licenses to possess and secure firearms of third persons.” This is comical, as there is no state or federal license to “possess and secure firearms.” In fact, neither the statutory nor regulatory law provide for FFLs to merely store firearms; rather, the law provides that an FFL may – depending on licensing – transfer, sell, manufacture, import or perform gunsmithing in relation to firearms and ammunition. Moreover, if you look at the state licensing provision – 18 Pa.C.S. § 6113 – it is only in relation to the sale of firearms. Thus, setting aside that there is no such allowance in the amendments to the Crimes Code and even limiting the issues to the state licensing, it is an impossibility to comply with this provision. Even more interesting, if a commercial armory violates any provision, HB 2060 provides that it forfeits its “federal and state licenses”; yet, the state lacks any legal authority to forfeit a federal license. It would seem that our elected representatives that voted for this bill have the Supremacy Clause of Article IV, Section 2 to the U.S. Constitution, backwards, but that isn’t surprising given their lack of comprehension for the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions.

Another similar issue arises in relation to the amendments to Title 23 permitting an attorney that represents the defendant to seek a third-party safekeeping permit, even though an attorney is not specified in the amendment to Crimes Code. But, our elected representatives shouldn’t let those pesky issues bother them, right?

Then, we turn to the separation of powers issue, where the Legislature requires that the Judiciary, in every final order, “must direct the defendant to refrain from abusing, harassing, stalking, threatening or attempting or threatening to use physical force against the plaintiff or minor children and must order that the Defendant is subject to the firearms, other weapons or ammunition and firearms license prohibition relinquishment provisions” regardless of whether any basis for this language exists.

With many elected representatives that do little more than pay lip-service to the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions, it is imperative that the voters remember several things in relation to the upcoming elections in November:

  1. The Prime Sponsor of HB 2060 is Marguerite Quinn, an alleged Republican, who is running for the PA Senate.
  2. All Members of the House of Representatives are up for re-election in November. You can find all the House Members that voted in FAVOR of HB 2060 here. Likewise remember those 63 House Members, who ardently defended the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions by voting AGAINST HB 2060, such as Representatives Aaron Bernstine, Russ Diamond, Jerry Knowles, David Maloney, Daryl Metcalfe, Jeff Pyle, Rick Saccone and Dave Zimmerman.
  3. Half of the Members of the Senate are up for re-election in November. You can find all the Senate Members that voted in FAVOR of HB 2060 here. Likewise, remember those 5 Senates Members, who ardently defended the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions by voting AGAINST HB 2060. They are Senators Camera Bartolotta, John Eichelberger, Scott Hutchinson, Elder Vogel, and Kim Ward.

 

 

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What exactly is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA.

It is quite common for a debtor to receive a call from a 3rd party he or she does not recognize concerning a delinquent debt. Often, the calls are at inconvenient times and are quite confusing since the debtor does not recall ever borrowing money from or having a credit account with the 3rd party. Typically, these parties are debt collectors working on behalf of the original creditor. However, often the original creditor cuts its losses, sells the delinquent account to 3rd parties for pennies on the dollar, and relinquishes all ownership of the account to the 3rd party.  Until last year, whether these third party buyers of debt where “debt collectors” as defined by the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)  and, therefore, subject to the FDCPA’s prohibitions and sanctions was unclear.

In June of 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a decision in Henson et. al. vs. Santander Consumer USA., Inc. which essential held that a purchaser of a defaulted debt who then seeks to collect the debt for itself is not a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA. The issue before the Court was whether a purchaser of defaulted debt meets the FDCPA’s definition of a “debt collector” as one who “regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due . . . another.” 15 U. S. C. §1692a(6).

The case involved Santander Consumer USA Inc. , a 3rd party buyer of debt, acquiring defaulted loans from CitiFinancial Auto and then trying to collect on those loans. The petitioners argued that this activity made Santander a debt collector subject to the FDCPA. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed because the debt purchaser was not seeking to collect a debt “owed . . . another” but sought instead only to collect debts that it purchased and owned.

The Supreme Court found that there was very little dispute between the parties as to the facts. The complaint alleged that CitiFinancial Auto loaned money to petitioners seeking to buy cars; that petitioners defaulted on those loans; that respondent Santander then purchased the defaulted loans from CitiFinancial; and that Santander sought to collect in ways petitioners believe troublesome under the FDCPA. The parties also agreed that in deciding whether Santander’s conduct falls within the FDCPA’s ambit we should look to statutory language defining the term “debt collector” to embrace anyone who “regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due . . . another.” 15 U. S. C. §1692a(6). The Supreme Court found that it did not and affirmed the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in a unanimous decision.

In its opinion, the Supreme Court did not consider petitioners’ argument that Santander could qualify as a debt collector not only because it regularly sought to collect for its own account debts that it has purchased, but also because it regularly acts as a third party collection agent for debts owed to others. Petitioners failed to raise the theory in their petition for certiorari.

Similarly, the Supreme Court refused to consider whether a purchaser of defaulted debt is engaged “in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.” §1692a(6). Under the FDCPA, the term “debt collector” is one that encompasses those engaged “in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.” §1692a(6). Again the Court refused to consider the argument as petitioners failed to raise it in their petition for certiorari.

In Gomez v. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC et al., the U. S District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seemed to arrive at decision contradicting Henson despite being bound by the Supreme Court’s ruling. (See Case No. 14-cv-9420 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2018)). The case primarily involved statute of limitation questions and what happens to a subsequent creditor’s right to collect interest if the original creditor stopped doing so after charge off. However, the Court also examined briefly whether a purchaser of defaulted debt is a debt collector subject to the FDCPA.

In Gomez, Plaintiffs incurred a credit card debt through FIA Card Services. In accordance with its policies, the account was charged off, and the bank stopped assessing interest on the account and stopped sending periodic statements. Eventually, the account was sold to Cavalry SPV I, LLC (Cavalry SPV), which placed the account for collection with Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC (CPS).

The court considered whether Cavalry SPV, as a debt purchaser, was subject to the FDCPA when CPS — not Cavalry SPV — was collecting on the debt. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s three-part definition of debt collector from Henson as “(1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector.”

The court looked at a Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships, 577 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2009) which was decided before Henson. Ruth states that a debt purchaser is considered a debt collector if the purchased debt is in default. The reasoning for this being “[t]he purchaser of an already-defaulted debt — like the debt collector, and unlike the originator and servicer of a non-defaulted debt — has no ongoing relationship with the debtor and, therefore, no incentive to engender goodwill by treating the debtor with honesty and respect.” Without any further analysis and seemingly at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Gomez court simply found that Cavalry SPV is subject to the FDCPA because it purchased the account in question after default.

The court in Gomez fails to explain the apparent contradiction between Ruth and  Henson. The court also fails to consider how Cavalry SPV and CPS, both of which contain “Cavalry” in their name, avoid the third part of the Henson definition – a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector.

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MONUMENTAL DECISION – Federal Court Rules It’s Unconstitutional to Strip Second Amendment Rights as a Result of a Second DUI

Today, Chief Counsel Joshua Prince and attorney Adam Kraut secured a major victory for Second Amendment jurisprudence in Holloway v. Sessions, et al., 1:17-CV-00081, where Chief Judge Christopher Connor of the Middle District of Pennsylvania ruled in a 21 page memorandum that it was unconstitutional as-applied to Mr. Holloway to preclude him in perpetuity from exercising his Second Amendment rights as a result of a 2005 DUI.

Specifically, after finding that DUI is a non-violent offense and calling the Defendants out in footnote 7 for their erroneous contention that “[f]orty-six states punish DUIs as felonies on a first or subsequent conviction,” the Court found that “[t]he government has not shown consensus regarding the seriousness of a generic second DUI offense, let alone a second DUI offense at a high rate of alcohol.” Thereafter, the Court went on to hold that “[a]fter a careful weighing of the Binderup factors, the court concludes that Holloway’s crime was not a ‘serious offense’ within the ambit of Section 922(g)(1).”

In turning to the second prong of Binderup, the Court held

The government has not satisfied its burden of proving that disarmament of Holloway, and other individuals like him, will promote public safety. It relies heavily on an expert report to support the proposition that individuals like Holloway “are substantially more likely to intentionally use firearms to harm others, inflict self-harm, and cause inadvertent harm. The expert report states that individuals with alcohol dependency or
abuse are more prone to violence and cites one study that suggests just over 50 percent of DUI offenders were alcohol dependent. (Doc. 61-4 at 4-5 & n.8). It further notes that alcohol abuse is often comorbid with mental illness and is strongly linked with domestic violence, youth violence, violent crime, and road rage. (Id. at 6-7). But nothing in the record suggests that Holloway was ever diagnosed with or suffered from alcohol dependence, alcohol abuse, or mental illness. Moreover, the report acknowledges that “it is not possible to determine with certainty whether these associations are causal.” (Id. at 6).

The Court then goes on to hold that “[t]he government has not demonstrated a substantial fit between Holloway’s continued disarmament and the important government interest of preventing armed mayhem.”

As such, the Court concludes:

Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Holloway. Holloway’s disqualifying conviction was not sufficiently serious to warrant deprivation of his Second Amendment rights, and disarmament of individuals such as Holloway is not sufficiently tailored to further the government’s compelling interest of preventing armed mayhem. The court will grant summary judgment, declaratory judgment, and permanent injunctive relief to Holloway.

The accompanying Order declares:

AND NOW, this 28th day of September, 2018, upon consideration of the plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 58) for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and defendants’ motion (Doc. 60) to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 58) for summary judgment is GRANTED.
2. Defendants’ motion (Doc. 60) to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment is DENIED.

3. It is ORDERED and DECLARED that the felon-in-possession ban of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff Raymond Holloway, Jr. (“Holloway”) in violation of the Second Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Defendants, together with all those acting in concert with them, are ENJOINED from enforcing, directing enforcement, or permitting enforcement of the felon-in-possession ban of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against Holloway.
4. The Clerk of Court shall enter declaratory judgment in Holloway’s favor on his Second Amendment claim, brought pursuant to Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336, 339 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017), challenging the felon-in-possession ban of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as applied to him, said judgment to be entered in accordance with paragraph 3.
5. The Clerk of Court shall thereafter close this case.

 

If your constitutional rights have been denied by the U.S. Government, contact Firearms Industry Consulting Group today to discuss YOUR rights and legal options.

 


Firearms Industry Consulting Group® (FICG®) is a registered trademark and division of Civil Rights Defense Firm, P.C., with rights and permissions granted to Prince Law Offices, P.C. to use in this article.

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Firearms Law Seminar – November 10, 2018 at Trop Gun Shop

On Saturday, November 10, 2018, from 10am – 2pm,  Chief Counsel Joshua Prince, Attorney Eric Winter, and Attorney Adam Kraut of Firearms Industry Consulting Group® (FICG®), a division of Civil Rights Defense Firm, P.C., in conjunction with Trop Gun Shop, will offer a four (4) hour seminar on state and federal firearms law at their store located at  910 North Hanover St, Elizabethtown, PA 17022. Lunch will be provided during the seminar.

To register, simply register online on Trop’s website. It is highly recommended that you register early, as last time it sold out fast.

 


Firearms Industry Consulting Group® (FICG®) is a registered trademark and division of Civil Rights Defense Firm, P.C., with rights and permissions granted to Prince Law Offices, P.C. to use in this article.

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EMERGENCY CALL TO ACTION – PA Firearm Rights in the Crosshairs! Only YOU can Prevent HB 2060 from being Enacted by the Senate

Today, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed House Bill 2060, over voluminous objections, including the unconstitutionality of many provisions, due to numerous misstatements about the applicability of this Bill. Although the Pennsylvania General Assembly’s website has not been updated at the time of writing this article, you will be able to find the Representatives that voted in favor of HB 2060 in the near future, here.

You can find my prior testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on the issue with HB 2060 here (see pgs 76-78) and Firearm Owners Against Crime (FOAC)‘s review, which I co-drafted, of all the issues with HB 2060 here.

A viewer previously sent this communication to his Representatives:

Gentlemen:

As a law abiding firearms owner, and nearly a life-long resident of the Commonwealth, I urge you all – in the most respectful yet strongest terms – to oppose the following bills in your respective chambers: HB 2060, HB 2109, HB 2227, and SB 1141.

Every one of these proposed bills upends thousands of years of “due process” tradition and Natural Rights; not to mention being in direct conflict with Article 1, Section 21 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of PA, and the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, both of which you all once swore an oath to uphold.

These bills all represent a “solution in search of a problem” merely to placate a vocal minority whose members have been the primary perpetrators of nearly every mass shooting event – excepting terrorist actors – for the past 60 years.

Although it may be politically expeditious to promote this type of legislation, the long-term damage done is not worth the short-term benefit that may make ignorant people feel better, but in reality, only endangers those already law-abiding and seeking merely to be left alone with the ability to protect and preserve their own lives and those of their loved ones.

A famous Pennsylvanian once said: “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” …Benjamin Franklin

I agree with his timeless words of warning, and pray for the sake of all current Pennsylvanians – and my children and grandchildren who live here too – that you do the same.

Thank you,

The bill will now be sent to the Senate and it is IMPERATIVE, if you cannot meet in person with your Senator, that you FAX at least your PA Senator, if not every Senator, and demand that they vote NO in relation to HB 2060. We understand that it takes more time and money to fax your representatives; however, it will ensure that your representative receives your communication and understands the importance to you of his/her vote on this matter. While there are numerous free-fax options, here is one to consider.

Please remember these House and Senate Members in the upcoming November election and, if you feel so inclined, in advance of the election, please take time to send them a correspondence informing them that due to their vote in favor of HB 2060, you will NOT be voting for them in November. Firearm Owners Against Crime (FOAC) has already informed all House Members that if they voted for HB 2060, FOAC would revoke its endorsement of them and intends to notify all Senators that if they vote in favor of HB 2060, their endorsement will likewise be revoked.

 

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